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Abstract— Malware are becoming a major problem to every 
individual and organization in the cyber world. They are 
advancing in sophistication in many ways. Besides their 
advanced abilities to penetrate and stay evasive against detection 
and remediation, they have strong resilience mechanisms that 
are defying all attempts to eradicate them. Malware are also 
attacking defence of the systems and making them defunct. 
When defences are brought down, the organisation or individual 
will lose control over the IT assets and defend against the 
Malware perpetuators. In order to gain the capability to defend, 
it is necessary to keep the defences or remediation tools active 
and not defunct. Given that Malware have proven to be resilient 
against deployed defences and remediation tools, the proposed 
research advocates to utilize the techniques used by Malware to 
harden the tools in a similar manner. In this paper, it is 
demonstrated that the proposition of using Malware’s resilient 
designs can be applied to harden the tools through experiments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today Malware is a major problem for all nations, 
organizations and individuals. According to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [1], 
billions of dollars have been incurred to manage this malice. 
The McAfee’s Quarter 1 2011 report [2] reported that by the 
end of 2011, they would have gathered 75 million Malware 
samples. According to a Norton’s cybercrime report for 2011 
[3], 431 million adults were cybercrime victims in 2010. $338 
billion were lost to cybercrime making it a more costly crime 
relative to drug crime. Malware remains the top threat in such 
criminal activities with 54 % of the survey respondents citing 
unfortunate encounters with Malware attacks. It also reported 
that the number of new Malware released into the wild is 
continually growing. Malware developers also shifting their 
focus to mobile smartphone platforms specifically the 
Android phones which many of us are dependent upon heavily 
for our daily lives.  
There are many anti-Malware products available in the 
market for individuals or organizations to use to defend 
against this malice. Defences like Firewall, Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) and Anti-Virus (AV) are intended to 
protect the IT assets which entail the computing resources, 
data and supporting infrastructures. These defences are 
becoming ineffective in both keeping the Malware at bay and 
contained. AUSCERT reckons that 80% of the Anti-Virus 
solutions are ineffective in detecting and removing Malware 
[4]. In a report by MessageLab, it noted that out of 31 Anti-
Virus companies, only 6 recognized the malicious file to 
contain a Malware [5]. According to Yan et al. [6], Malware 
developers are advancing their software products to enable 
them to completely bypass the protection of Firewall and 
Anti-Virus. According to Filiol [30], Malware detection is a 
NP-hard problem. Besides the fact that these defences are 
becoming ineffective against Malware, these defences are also 
becoming victims of attacks by Malware as part of the latter’s 
self-preservation strategy [21], [27]. The starting point of this 
cyber problem with Malware is their ability to infiltrate. This 
is typically done through the weakest link in the defence 
strategy due to humans are involved. One went as far as to 
comment that it is people’s stupidity that led to security lapses 
[7]. Malware will inevitably infiltrate past the defences and 
when they do, it is essential to quickly contain these Malware 
before they induce greater damages to the organizations. 
According to the Malware Attribute Enumeration and 
Characterization (or MAEC), which is a Malware knowledge 
framework defined by MITRE – an American non-profit 
organization chartered to work on technologies related to 
public interest, the handling of Malware when the Malware 
successfully gets pass the defences is known as Malware 
Remediation [8]. However containment or remediation tools 
used today are not able to match the sophistication of Malware 
and are being defeated by this malice [17]. The defences and 
remediation tools will need to stay effective in order to have 
the ability to defend the IT assets. 
This research advocates that the resilient characteristics or 
resilient design pattern of Malware can be used to harden the 
defences and remediation tools so that the malice could be 
negated. The next section of this paper provides an overview 
of the proposition. A survey of related researches follows. 
This is then followed by a description of the evaluation and 
experiments carried out and an analysis of the experimental 
results. Finally, a conclusion with considerations of the future 
research directions ends this paper.  
II. MALWARE EPIDEMIC : THE LOSING BATTLE 
When a Malware successfully gets past the defences and 
infects an organization or individual’s computing host(s), 
there will be many risks induced. Such Malware may use the 
infected computers to steal classified data, launch attacks on 
other computing resources or disrupt business operations. 
Control over IT assets is important to both organizations and 
individuals. The objective of the Malware is to gain control 
over the IT assets in order to achieve its malicious objectives. 
The extent of control an organization or individual has over its 
IT assets following a Malware’s successful penetration is 
proportional affects the risks that the Malware induces to the 
organization. The following diagram illustrates this premise 
with a qualitative analysis. 
 
 
Table 1: Organizational Risks From Malware Control 
 
In order for the organization or individual to restore control 
of IT assets, the availability and integrity of defences and 
remediation tools to be used against Malware are important. 
When these tools are made defunct, the control of IT assets, in 
some measures, is gone too. The focus of this research is to 
study ways to strengthen the resilience of anti-malware 
solutions and containment tools in fending themselves against 
the self-preservation attacks of Malware.  This aims to enable 
such solutions or tools to retain their effectiveness to enable 
the organization or individual to keep or restore control of its 
IT assets. Before exploring such resiliency designs, the 
situation confronted by the defence and remediation tools are 
first studied.  
A. Anti-Malware Solutions: a Victim of Malware ? 
There are many anti-Malware products available in the 
market. They are intended to protect the IT assets. However 
they are now becoming victims of Malware attack. Malware 
that preserves itself by attacking anti-virus software by 
rendering them defunct are known as retrovirus or retroworm 
[9]. They are also known as “Armored Malware” [29]. A 
detailed analysis report on Conficker [13] reported that the 
variant C of the Malware explicitly terminates running 
security software. Malware are also exploiting the 
vulnerabilities of anti-virus solution (AV) in order to defunct 
the defences [26], [27]. According to Landesman [28], since 
July 2001, ApBot worm was among the first Malware that 
targeted a range of antivirus software, Trojan detectors and 
firewall products. Besides eradicating the AV as a means to 
preserve the Malware, the latter has induced a false negative 
impression to defences by putting the AV into a ‘brain dead’ 
state. According to Vass about Storm Worm [11], this was 
done to circumvent the network access control (NAC) with 
quarantine capability that will inhibit unsecure clients from 
connecting to the network. Anti-Malware companies are 
developing solutions to protect their products from Malware 
attacks. However Malware developers are responding 
accordingly. A question to be considered when developing 
countermeasures to harden the tools – What can be learnt from 
the adversary ? 
B. Remediation Tools: Another victim of Malware 
When the Malware gets pass the deployed defences, 
Malware Remediation is required. This entails using 
containment processes and tools to facilitate the containment 
of the raging or defiant Malware. Even then, Malware are 
being developed to withstand containment or response 
measures taken against them [17]. These tools used for 
remediation are being attacked or made defunct by the 
Malware. An example is the ‘W32/Sality.gen.c’ virus 
(according to Mcafee) [24] that disables the use of Task 
Manager and Windows registry editors on infected computers. 
Such tools are required to facilitate Malware remediation. The 
notorious Conficker or ‘W32/Conficker.worm’ worm 
(according to Mcafee) [25] makes explicit attempts to find 
Malware analysis tools like wireshark (network packet 
monitoring tool), tcpview (network packet tool monitoring 
tool), procmon (Sys internals registry monitoring tool) and 
gmer (rootkit detection tool). Malware are also exploiting 
vulnerabilities in tools used by Malware analysts or incident 
responders to launch another offensive attack [12]. 
An obvious reason for losing the effectiveness of the anti-
Malware solution and remediation processes or tools to 
contain them is that the approaches used by the defenders are 
openly known to all including Malware developers. The latter 
can then develop mechanisms to overcome or defunct the 
defences causing the defences to become victims of Malware 
self-preservation attacks instead of being protectors. Anti-
Malware solution developers and incident responders, tasked 
to salvage Malware infiltration incident, need a means to level 
off the face-off with Malware developers. The element of 
known and unknown gave Malware developers an advantage. 
Defenders need it too. 
III. RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
The research proposition in this paper is to learn from the 
resilient techniques or designs incorporated into Malware to 
preserve themselves and to adopt these techniques or designs 
into the defensive and remediation tools. The intent is to 
preserve the availability and integrity of these tools in order to 
provide the organization and individual with the ability to 
keep or restore control of its IT assets. 
In a study by Alsagoff [10] on Malware’s self-protection 
mechanism, he noted that Malware developers are developing 
various techniques to enhance the resiliency of their products 
against any eradication processes. The following table 
summarizes the qualitative evaluation of the techniques used 
by Malware developers and their potential reuse by developers 
of anti-Malware or remediation tools to protect themselves 
from Malware self-preservation attacks. 
 
Techniques used in Malware Relevance to this Research 
Terminate adversarial and 
related software (eg, anti-
Malware) 
Terminate known malicious 
processes first before they 
attack 
Techniques used in Malware Relevance to this Research 
Hide or obfuscate Malware 
files and configuration 
(including startup) 
Hide or obfuscate tool from 
detection by Malware 
Protect malicious processes, 
files and configuration from 
manipulation 
Protect important processes, 
files and configuration from 
Malware’s manipulation 
Exploitation of limits of 
operating system 
Exploit limits of operating 
system to protect tool 
Disable support tools (eg, 
task manager, registry editor, 
startup configuration tool) 
Disable support tools that 
may be used by Malware  
Redundancy (eg, multiple 
startup point) 
Include similar redundancy 
capabilities into tool 
Recovery capabilities (eg, 
reinstate removed startup 
point) 
Include similar recovery 
capabilities into tool 
Table 2: Analysis Of Malware Resilience Design 
 
Another prevalent technique used by Malware developers 
to undermine anti-Malware solutions and Malware analysis 
attempts is obfuscation [36]. According to Dagon et al. [33], 
Botnets have considerable resilience to withstand targeted 
responses against them. They have been known to revive 
themselves even when they have decapitated [34]. An 
example (can we be more specific of this example?) of the 
resiliency of Botnets occurred when researchers analysed, 
confirmed and initiated the shutdown of a key ISP that hosted 
the Malware, while the traffic originating from the Malware 
dropped immediately, it soon recovered [35]. The resilience 
and robust architecture design of Malware enables the 
perpetrator(s) to keep its offensive effectiveness against its 
targeted victims and to fend off response measures by the 
victims’ defenders.  
Malware developers are incorporating advance 
technologies to enhance the resiliency of their products. 
Malware like Zellome incorporated Artificial Intelligence 
capabilities to facilitate polymorphic behaviour to protect 
itself from being detected [22]. Malware also have anti-
forensic capabilities to prevent any forensic or analysis 
attempts to be done on them in order to contain them [9], [12]. 
Brand et. al [12] cited various anti-forensics mechanisms that 
have been incorporated into modern Malware such as anti-
online analysis which prevent online analysis from being able 
to analyse the Malware, anti-dissemblers to prevent reverse 
engineering the Malware, and, anti-tools which exploit 
vulnerabilities to analysis tools applied to them. Other notable 
attributes of Malware advancement include self-preservation, 
self-healing and self-updating capabilities. Such attributes 
have been incorporated to enhance the resilience against 
attempts to eradicate them. According to Shevchenko [23], 
there are various forms of self-preserving capabilities being 
incorporated into Malware. The following diagram illustrates 
the approaches used. They are namely in the dimensions of 
generic or targeted against countermeasures used by defence 
or containment tools, also whether the self-preservation 
approaches are passive or active in nature.  
 
Figure 1: Extract from Shevchenko [23] 
 
Malware has been known to launch counter offense that 
includes destruction of the infected system when they detect 
an attempt to take them down is being initiated [32]. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
There are a number of researches done to harden or protect 
defences or remediation tools after attacks. According to Xue 
[26], there are vulnerabilities in anti-virus software. The 
author noted four kinds of vulnerabilities in such software. 
Firstly, they are local privilege escalation where the antivirus 
software like other software is at risk of being exploited to 
gain uncompromised access to the Operating System. 
Secondly, ActiveX vulnerabilities have been exploited. 
Antivirus software that uses such technology is exposed. 
Thirdly the engine of the antivirus software is complex due to 
the complexity of the adversary that it is trying to defeat. 
However with such complexity, there will be vulnerabilities in 
them which can be exploited. Finally, most antivirus software 
has management components to facilitate the administration 
of such software. Typically they use client server designs to 
develop these components. Such design uses various forms of 
TCP/IP communication protocols to communicate which in 
turn have vulnerabilities. Xue’s recommendation to mitigate 
the risks of vulnerability exploitation in antivirus software was 
to adopt security development lifecycle into the development 
of antivirus software, and to conduct audits and fuzzing tests 
on the software products. Finally, it was recommended to 
setup an avenue for updates to be pushed down in a timely 
manner. Another researcher, Srinivasan, advocated that 
antivirus software can be protected against Malware attacks 
by hiding the antivirus software from other processes 
including those belonging to the Malware [27]. His solution 
entails changing the names of the files, registry entries and 
using a different name. His proposition matches that of the 
behaviour of Malware. However he stopped short of stating 
the techniques used by Malware. Kerivan and Brothers [31] 
conducted a series of attack tests, likened to those initiated by 
Malware, against a few security software namely IPS and 
antivirus.  Their test demonstrated that none of the security 
software could fend themselves against such forms of attacks, 
however the IPS was more robust than the antivirus software.   
However, none of the above mentioned researches 
explicitly studied Malware’s resiliency designs or mechanisms 
and assessed whether they can be incorporated into defence 
tools used in prevention and containment to enhance its 
resilience. This forms the motivation and proposal of this 
study. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
In order to verify that the hypothesis that Malware’s self-
preservation techniques can be used in tools for defence or 
remediation, three experiments were done and the results were 
analysed to assess their effectiveness – that is to remain 
resiliently active when Malware like offensive attacks are 
used against these tools. The independent variable is the 
resilient design technique used in the tools. The dependent 
variable is the specific attribute to which the resiliency design 
is seeking to protect or harden against Malware attacks. In the 
experiments that were carried out, (A) a specific attribute is 
selected where the resilient characteristics of the Malware will 
be applied upon or built around and where the focus of an 
attack vector that is typically used by Malware will be applied 
against. The specific attribute used in this experiment would 
be either a dependent software like the firewall of the targeted 
host, registry setting, or the availability of the tool itself. (B) 
The attack vector was chosen from Mitre’s Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [14] as it 
represents a body of knowledge on attack patterns. CAPEC is 
used by Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization 
or MAEC [15] which the latter defines the behaviour and 
characteristics of Malware while the former defines the 
Malware’s offensive behaviours. (C) An application was 
developed that codified a specific resilient techniques used by 
Malware to protect a specific attribute. The application was 
developed using Visual Express C# 2010. Prior to the start of 
the experiment, (D) a check is first done that to ensure that the 
attribute to be preserved for the test is set or running well. 
This will be the pre-test step for the experiment. (E) A tool 
that mimics the Malware’s offensive behaviour to attack 
software was used to carry out the self-preservation attacks. 
The offensive tool used in our experiments was Metasploit 
Framework Version 4.0.1. This tool has been used to develop 
Malware or offensive hacking [18], [19], [20]. (F) The 
application, which was developed to protect the attribute, 
would, either pre-emptively or be triggered, to preserve or 
protect the attribute when the Metasploit tool is used. The 
activation of the preservative measures by our custom built 
software could be triggered manually or automatically. Finally 
(G) a verification was done to check whether the attribute to 
protect was effectively preserved against the assault. This will 
be the post-test step for the experiment. As Metasploit 
Framework’s Meterpreter was used in the experiment, the 
resident protection of the antivirus installed in the test host 
was disabled to facilitate the use of the former (former or 
formal?) tool to carry out offensive attacks against the test 
application. 
The setup of the experiment was done in a virtualization 
environment running on a Mac Pro laptop. Virtualization was 
done using Virtualbox version 3.2.1. Two guest operating 
systems were used. One was the targeted host, which ran on 
Windows XP SP3, from which the application ran and where 
the attribute to protect resided. This host was then connected 
by Meterpreter to the other virtualized host running 
BackTrack 5 with Metasploit Framework Version 4.0.1 
included. Throughout the execution of the experiments, 
Internet connectivity was not enabled and the experiments 
were carried in an isolated environment. 
A. Experiment 1 
The objective of the experiment is to show that a dependent 
software like firewall can be protected using self-preservation 
techniques used by Malware. The attribute in this experiment 
is the firewall service. This attack vector used is to turn off the 
firewall which is also known to CAPEC as CAPEC-56: 
Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic'. The following are the 
pseudo code for the application used.  
 
 
Figure 2: Pseudo Code To Restore Disabled Service 
 
The following are the outputs of the experiment to show 
that initially the firewall was working with no warning 
notification raised by the Operating System, this was followed 
by the attack vector to disable the firewall done through 
Metasploit’s Meterpreter and finally re-enable the firewall by 
the proposed application. The proposed application carried out 
the re-instatement of firewall by clicking on the button that 
corresponded to the test. The following diagram is the 
application GUI prior to the start of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Snap-Shot Of Custom Developed Application For 
Experiment 
 
The following notification alert by the Operating System 
indicated that only the AV was not running. The firewall is 
running still. 
 
 
Figure 4: Security Alert Message That Anti-Virus Was Turned 
Off 
 
Next, the offensive attack was initiated with a firewall 
termination instruction from Metasploit, the targeted host 
reported that the firewall is not running as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 5: Security Alert Message That Firewall And Anti-
Virus Were Turned Off 
 
The application, running on the targeted host, was instructed 
to reinstate the firewall service on the targeted host. 
 
 
Figure 6: Status Reflected On Custom Developed Application 
 
(F) The following is the response notification alert from the 
targeted host showed that the firewall was back on again 
indicating our software successfully restored the status of the 
firewall. 
 
 
Figure 7: Alert Status Message Indicated That Only Anti-
Virus Was Turned Off 
B. Experiment 2 
The objective is to demonstrate the use of self-preservation 
techniques to preserve registry settings from undesired 
changes. The technique used to preserve the registry setting is 
to constantly monitor the setting and to respond when a 
change (update or delete) occurs. In this experiment, the 
attack vector is to induce a change to the registry setting flag 
value. This attack vector is also known as CAPEC-203: 
Manipulate Application Registry Values. The followings are 
the pseudo code for the application that have been developed 
to preserve the registry setting flag value.  
 
 
Figure 8: Pseudo Code For Protecting Registry Settings 
 
The following are the outputs of the experiment to show the 
stages of the tests, pre-experiment registry setting value, the 
registry change executed by Metasploit’s Meterpreter and 
finally restoration of registry value by the proposed 
application.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Flag Status (True) Prior To Start Of Experiment 
 
Figure 10: Changed Induced To Registry Settings 
 
Figure 11: Custom Application Restored Value Of Registry 
Settings 
C. Experiment 3 
The objective of this experiment is to demonstrate the use 
of self-preservation techniques to preserve the application that 
we developed ourselves from offensive termination attack. In 
this experiment, the offensive attack carried out was to 
terminate our application. This attack vector is also known as 
CAPEC-17: Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable 
Files. The self-preservation technique used is to randomize the 
process name of the application and executable file so that it 
cannot be detected by the offensive software, Metasploit, 
hence protecting the application from sudden abrupt 
termination. The following is the pseudo code of the 
application. 
 
 
Figure 12: Pseudo Code For Obfuscation Of Custom 
Application Process Name 
 
The followings are outputs from the experiment. The 
outputs entail Metasploit successfully identified and 
terminated our application, the application randomized its 
process name and Metasploit was not able to identify and 
terminate the application.  
 
 
Figure 13: Use Of Metasploit To Identify And Terminate 
Targeted Application Process 
 
 
Figure 14: Custom Application Used Randomly Generated 
Process Name 
 
 
Figure 15: Metasploit Could Not Identify And Terminate The 
Application 
 
D. Analysis Of Results 
The experiments demonstrated that the Malware’s 
resilience software design techniques could be codified and 
incorporated to protect the applications. These and other 
Malware’s resilient design approaches can be applied to 
security defence or remediation tools in order to harden them 
against self-preservation attacks of Malware.  
VI. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Resilient design techniques used in Malware can be 
incorporated into the security tools, however there are some 
considerations as to how these techniques should be applied. 
The following are considerations gathered from the 
experiments. 
• What attribute to be protected 
• Why resilient technique is applicable 
• When should such resilient techniques be applied 
• Where to apply resilient design technique 
• Which resilient design technique is relevant 
• How to implement such resilient techniques 
• Self-preserving offensive techniques by Malware  
• Residual risks when using such technique 
For security defense and remediation tools to protect the 
organization or individual from being infiltrated by the 
extensive variety of Malware or the ever changing behavior of 
the Malware, more than one of the resilient techniques may be 
required to be applied. A knowledge or rule based technique 
will be required to learn about the attack and deploy the 
appropriate counter measures accordingly. 
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Malware are attacking security solutions in order to 
preserve themselves for longer periods and in turn to induce 
more risks and damages to organizations and individuals. The 
current situation is in favor of the Malware and their 
developers. The proposition in this paper is to learn from the 
Malware characteristics in the way they harden their products 
and to apply their resiliency design techniques to the security 
solutions. Such resilient design approaches can be formalized 
into a body of knowledge in the form of design patterns. They 
can then be subsequently incorporated into defense or 
containment/remediation tools in order to prolong the 
effectiveness of the tool much like the intent of Malware. In 
addition, the attack vectors of the Malware can be used to 
evaluate the resilience strength of the tool as part of the 
security development lifecycle. 
Future research options to this proposition are: 
a. Conduct experiments with real Malware to further 
verify the research proposition. 
b. Mapping of Malware attack vectors to resilient 
designs. 
  
REFERENCES 
[1] OECD Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP) in 
partnership with the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
Telecommunication and Information Working Group (APEC TEL) 
Security and Prosperity Steering Group (SPSG), “Malicious Software 
(Malware): A Security Treat to the Internet Economy”, OECD 
Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the Internet Economy., 
DSTI/ICCP/REG(2007)5/FINAL, Jun. 17, 2007.   
[2] McAfee Labs, “McAfee Threats Report: First Quarter 2011”, McAfee, 
2011. 
[3] P. Eng, “Study: Global cybercrime costs more than illegal drugs”, 
ConsumerReports.org, Sep. 7, 2011. . [Online]. Available: 
http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2011/09/study-global-
cybercrime-costs-more-than-fighting-llegal-drugs.html. [Accessed Nov. 
6, 2011]. 
[4] M. Kotadia, “Eighty percent of new malware defeats antivirus”, ZDNet 
Australia, Jul. 19, 2006. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/eighty-percent-of-new-malware-defeats-
antivirus-139263949.htm. [Accessed Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[5] A. Shipp, “MessageLabs Intelligence Special Report:Targeted Attacks 
April 2007”, MessageLabs, Apr. 2007. 
[6] W. Yan, Z. Zhang and N. Ansari, “Revealing Packed Malware”, IEEE 
Security & Privacy, Issue5, Page 65 – 69, Sept. 2008.  
[7] R. Naraine, “Microsoft Says Recovery from Malware Becoming 
Impossible”, eWeek, Apr. 4, 2006. 
[8] Mitre, “MAEC – Use Cases – Malware Remediation”, Mitre, Jan. 19, 
2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://maec.mitre.org/language/usecases.html#remediation. [Accessed 
Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[9] P. Szor, “The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense”, Addison-
Wesley Professional, ISBN:032130454, 2005.  
[10] S. N. Alsagoff, “Malware Self Protection Mechanism”, ITSim 2008. 
International Symposium on Information Technology, Page 1 - 8, Aug. 
26, 2008. 
[11] L. Vaas, “Storm Worm Botnet Lobotomizing Anti-Virus Programs”, 
eWeek.com, Oct. 24, 2007. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Storm-Worm-Botnet-
Lobotomizing-AntiVirus-Programs/. [Accessed Nov. 5, 2011]. 
[12] M. Brand, C. Valli and A. Woodward, “Malware Forensics: Discovery 
of the Intent of Deception”, Australian Digital Forensics Conference, 
2010. 
[13] P. Porras, H. Saidi and V. Yegneswaran, “An analysis of conficker’s 
logic and rendezvous points”, SRI International, Mar. 19, 2009. 
[Online]. Available: http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/. [Accessed Oct. 2, 
2011]. 
[14] Mitre, “Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC)”, Mitre Corporation. [Online]. Available: 
http://capec.mitre.org/. [Accessed Oct. 2, 2011]. 
[15] I. Kirillov, P. Chase, D. Beck and R. Martin, “Malware Attribute 
Enumeration and Characterization”, Mitre, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://maec.mitre.org/about/docs/Introduction_to_MAEC_white_paper.
pdf. [Accessed Oct. 2, 2011]. 
[16] S. N. Alsagoff, “Manual Removal of Malware – Is It Still Relevant?”, 
International Journal of Research and Reviews in Information Security 
and Privacy (IJRRISP) Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2011. 
[17] D. Piscitello, “Conficker Summary and Review”, ICANN, May 7, 
2010. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.icann.org/en/security/conficker-summary-review-
07may10-en.pdf. [Accessed Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[18] Alberg, “Home made malware”, ParanoidProse.com, Feb. 21, 2011. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.paranoidprose.com/2011/02/21/home-
made-malware/. [Accessed Oct. 4, 2011]. 
[19] J. Marquez, “An Analysis of the IDS Penetration Tool: Metasploit”, 
The InfoSec Writers Text Library, Dec. 9, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.infosecwriters.com/texts.php?op=display&id=656. 
[Accessed Oct. 4, 2011]. 
[20] A. Fucs, A. P. Barros and V. Pereira, “New botnets trends and threats”, 
Blackhat 2007, 2007.  
[21] J.Rutkowska, “Subverting the Vista Kernel for Fun and Profit”, 
Blackhat Briefings, 2006. 
[22] J. Pan, C.C. Fung, “Artificial Intelligence in Malware – Cop or 
Culprit?”, The Ninth Postgraduate Electrical Engineering & 
Computing Symposium PEECS 2008, The University of Western 
Australia, Perth, Australia, 2008. 
[23] A. Shevchenko, “The evolution of self-defense technologies in 
malware”, SecureList.com, Jun. 28, 2007. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204791949/The_evolution_of_s
elf_defense_technologies_in_malware. [Accessed Oct. 9, 2011]. 
[24] McAfee, “W32.Sality.gen.c”, McAfee Global Threat Intelligence 
Website, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_154584.htm. [Accessed Nov. 6, 2011].  
[25] K. Gudgion, “Finding W32/Conficker.worm”, McAfee Avert Labs, 
Apr. 8, 2009. [Online]. Available : 
https://community.mcafee.com/docs/DOC-1092/version/1. [Accessed 
Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[26] F. Xue, “Attacking Antivirus”, Blackhat Europe, 2008. 
[27] R. Srinivasan, “Protecting Anti-virus Software under Viral Attacks”, 
Arizona State University, Aug. 2007.   
[28] M. Landesman, “How Vulnerable is Your Security?”, About.com, Sep. 
15, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://antivirus.about.com/library/weekly/aa121301d.htm. [Accessed 
Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[29] T. M. Chen, “Trends in Viruses and Worms”, Internet Protocol Journal, 
vol. 6, pp. 23-33, Sep. 2003. 
[30] E. Filiol, “Malware of the Future: When Mathematics work for the 
Dark Side”, Hack.lu Conference, Oct. 22, 2008. 
[31] J. E. Kerivan and K. Brothers, “Self-defending security software”, 
Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2005, IEEE, Oct. 17, 
2005. 
[32] D. Goodin, “DDoS malware comes with self-destruct payload”, The 
Register, Mar. 9, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/09/ddos_bots_self_destruct/. 
[Accessed Oct. 23, 2011]. 
[33] D. Dagaon, G. Gu and C. Lee, “A Taxonomy of Botnet Structures”, 
Botnet Detection, Advances in Information Security, Springer, Vol. 36, 
143-164, 2008 
[34] K. J. Higgins, “Bots Hard To Kill -- Even When Botnets Get 
Decapitated”, Darkreading, Oct. 15, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability-
management/167901026/security/application-
security/227900069/index.html. [Accessed Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[35] J. Robertson, “Huge Botnet Amputated, but Criminals Reconnect”, 
Seattle Times Newspaper, Mar. 10, 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2011312087
_apustecbotnettakedown.html. [Accessed Nov. 6, 2011]. 
[36] P. O’Kane, S. Sezer, K. McLaughlin, “Obfuscation: The Hidden 
Malware”, IEEE Security & Privacy, Vol. 9, Issue 5, Pg 41-47, Sep-
Oct. 2011.
 
